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This paper studies the impact of separation from marital and cohabiting 
relationships on political party preferences. Relying on longitudinal data (1999-
2017) from the Swiss Household Panel, it examines to what extent differences in 
party preferences between partnered and separated individuals are the result of a 
selection effect (with individuals who separate having different party preferences 
prior to their separation compared with partnered individuals) or of a causal 
effect (with individuals changing their party preferences following separation). 
The analyses show that partnered individuals are significantly more likely to 
support a party with Christian values (the CVP) compared with separated 
individuals, and indicate that this is due to a selection effect. For populist right 
(SVP) voting, we find a causal effect of separation. Interestingly, the event of 
separation increases the likelihood of supporting the populist right SVP. While 
separated individuals are more likely to support the social democratic party (PSS) 
than married individuals, we do not find a significant selection or causal effect of 
separation on support for the PSS. Overall, our results confirm the relevance of 
taking a dynamic approach distinguishing selection and causal effects and reveal 
that while the effect of separation on voters’ party choice is modest but 
significant.  
Keywords: separation, divorce, political party preference, panel data analysis, 
multiparty system, Switzerland  
Introduction 
Family life has changed dramatically among all Western post-industrialized societies 
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during the last few decades. The decline in marital stability and increase of separation1 
has been among the most important of these changes. Hence, it is not surprising that the 
effect of separation has been widely studied in the social sciences, showing that 
separation has a profound impact on people’s lives, including their socioeconomic 
position, social networks, and political participation and interest (e.g. Kalmijn and 
Broese van Groenou 2005; Stoker and Jennings 1995; Duncan and Hoffman 1985; 
Voorpostel and Coffé 2012). Little is, however, known about the effect of separation on 
political party choice. Given the increasing levels of separation around the globe, 
understanding this link and the political salience of separation is crucial. If separation is 
found to affect party choice, it may also help us to understand the growing volatility in 
electoral outcomes and choices. 
Since separation is known to influence various characteristics which impact 
people’s party choice, such as their socioeconomic position, it seems fair to assume that 
separation will affect party choice. In addition, previous research has revealed that 
being married influences people’s party preference (Coffé and Need 2010; Lampard 
1997; Stoker and Jennings 2005; Kingston and Finkel 1987). If marriage changes 
people’s party preference, ending a marriage is also likely to have an effect. Most of the 
limited existing research does indeed suggest that separation has an impact on people’s 
party preferences (e.g. Edlund et al. 2005; Chapman 1985; Edlund and Pande 2002; 
Fahs 2007; Kingston and Finkel 1987; Plutzer and McBurnett 1991; Smith 2007; 
Wilson and Lusztig 2004; but see Kern 2010).  
                                                 
1  We use the term separation in reference to both the dissolution of a marriage and a 
cohabitating relationship, and the term separated in reference to people whose marriage or 
cohabitating relationship has ended.  
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Our study aims to add to the literature on the link between separation and party 
choice using data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) (1999-2017). In contrast to 
the cross-sectional data used in most existing research (Edlund et al. (2005), Edlund and 
Pande (2002) and Kern (2010) being notable exceptions), the SHP data gives us the 
opportunity to investigate changes in people’s relationship status in a dynamic way. 
This allows us to investigate not only how political party preferences of partnered2 and 
separated individuals differ, but also enables us to assess whether, and to what extent, 
this difference is due to the actual event of separation, or whether people who will 
experience separation already have a different party preference prior to their separation 
compared with individuals who will not experience a separation. Moreover, the Swiss 
context allows us to investigate the effect of separation in a multiparty context. 
Before moving to the introduction of our data and analyses, the next section 
presents relevant theories on the effect of separation on party choice and how this can 
be explained, thereby focusing on two explanations: a selection effect and a causal 
effect. 
Theoretical background 
Separation and party choice 
Divorce rates across the developed world have steadily increased over recent decades 
(Amato 2010; Coleman 2013; González and Viitanen 2009; Kennedy and Ruggles 
2014). Indeed, the commonly quoted statistic that around half of marriages in the US 
end in divorce appears to be not far from the truth (Amato 2010). Divorce rates in 
                                                 
2  We use the term partnered in reference to people who are married or in cohabitating 
relationships. 
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Europe have also been steadily climbing, with many countries having divorce rates in 
the 30 to 40 percent range (Coleman 2013). The experience of separation has the 
potential to produce profound changes in people’s lives, including relocation (often to 
less favourable housing), a general deterioration of living standards, and, more often for 
women, re-entering the labour market while also facing childrearing duties as a lone 
parent (Amato 2010, Struffolino, Bernardi and Voorpostel 2016). These new 
circumstances may well be accompanied by changing views on society as well as on the 
role of the government in providing welfare or childcare arrangements. As a result, 
political party preference may change. Given the high and increasing divorce rates, it is 
important to understand these possible changes in party preference. If separation does 
indeed affect citizens’ voting behaviour, it could significantly affect electoral outcomes 
given the frequency that separation occurs in society.  
Studies that have focussed on the relationship between separation and party 
choice have indeed found that there is a link between separation and party choice. 
Generally, those who are separated are more likely to vote for left-wing parties (see 
however Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2012; Kern 2010). For example, using 
British and American data respectively, studies by Chapman (1985) and Kingston and 
Finkel (1987) (see also Fahs 2007 looking at female graduates of Michigan) 
demonstrate that divorced individuals are more likely to vote left-wing, and to have 
more leftist political attitudes and policy preferences than married people, who tend to 
be more likely to vote right-wing (Plutzer and McBurnett 1991). Using data from the 
1972-2006 General Social Surveys, Smith (2007) shows how family structure is 
associated with political participation and voting behaviour, with the married leaning to 
the right and most non-married groups to the left. Also, he demonstrates how the 
political role of family structure has increased over time. These findings have been 
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replicated in Canada, where Wilson and Lusztig (2004) used election study data to show 
that married people are more likely than the unmarried to lean towards the right 
politically. The majority of studies on the relationship between separation and vote 
choice hypothesise – but typically do not empirically test – that there is a causal link 
through changes in the economic status of those who experience separation (Kern 
2010). 
The main limitation of most of the studies discussed so far is that they are based 
on cross-sectional data, and do not actually observe individuals going through a 
separation. Therefore, they cannot draw definite conclusions about whether separation 
caused a change in party preferences or whether the group of separated individuals 
already held different preferences prior to their separation. Only a handful of existing 
studies do use panel data. Edlund et al. (2005) and Edlund and Pande (2002) use a 
longitudinal design for data in Europe and the US respectively and conclude that 
separation does cause individuals – particularly women – to lean more to the left. These 
studies do, however, not systematically theorize and empirically investigate a possible 
distinction between selection and causality. Kern (2010), in his turn, does not exploit 
the longitudinal structure to estimate the effect of separation by following individuals 
experiencing the event while in the panel but rather compares divorced with 
continuously married (and widowed) individuals. He does not find an effect of 
separation. 
The current study solves the shortcomings of previous research and explores two 
possible explanations for the link between separation and party choice: a selection effect 
and a causal effect. In the following two sub-sections, we examine literature relating to 
separation and political behaviour, and propose hypotheses to test the extent to which 
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the link between separation and vote choice can be explained by a selection or causal 
effect. 
A Selection Effect 
People who will eventually separate may have a different party preference prior to this 
event, given that characteristics known to be related to party choice are also known to 
affect the likelihood of experiencing a separation. The risk of divorce is lower for 
couples who both hold on to the traditional, gender-specialized division of labour, 
especially if the wife holds more traditional gender values (Hohmann-Marriott 2006; 
Kalmijn, De Graaf and Poortman 2004). Gender egalitarian attitudes are known to 
increase the likelihood of supporting left-wing, liberal parties (Inglehart and Norris 
2003).  
Furthermore, religious couples are less likely to divorce, probably due to the 
pro-family outlook of most religions (de Graaf and Kalmijn 2006; Lehrer 2004). 
Religious individuals are also more likely to support religious or conservative parties 
(van der Brug, Hobolt and de Vreese 2009). Those who will eventually separate may 
thus already be less likely to support a religious party prior to their separation than 
couples who stay continuously partnered.  
Overall, given that characteristics such as religion, and family and gender values 
are related to both the likelihood of experiencing a separation and party choice, we 
expect to find a selection effect with individuals who will separate having a different 
party preference prior to their separation compared with continuously partnered 
individuals. Our first hypothesis thus reads:   
Hypothesis 1: Separated individuals are less likely to support parties with 
traditional family values and a religious background prior to their 
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separation compared with individuals who will not experience a 
separation.  
The selection effect may, however, differ between women and men as some 
research has shown a different effect of religiosity and gender values on the likelihood 
to separate between women and men. For example, research has revealed that women 
with traditional views on gender and division of labour are less likely to separate 
whereas egalitarian women may be more likely to consider or anticipate divorce (e.g. 
Greenstein 1995; Lueptow, Guss and Hyden 1989). By contrast, men with egalitarian 
attitudes have been found to be less likely to separate than men with traditional attitudes 
(e.g. Blair 1993; Kaufman 2000). Given the link between traditional gender attitudes 
and supporting parties with traditional family values, the expectation that separated 
individuals will be less likely to support parties with traditional family values will 
particularly hold among women. There is also some evidence suggesting that the 
negative effect of religion on separation is stronger among women than men (Brown, 
Orbuch and Bauermeister 2008). Therefore, it is in particular separated women who 
may be less likely to support parties with a religious background prior to their 
separation. Hence, we also propose the following variation of Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1a: Hypothesis 1 is expected to be stronger among women compared 
with men. 
A Causal Effect  
There are various factors that may cause the experience of separation to have an effect 
on party preference. First, it is known that married partners tend to vote for the same 
party, partly because they influence one another (Coffé and Need 2010; Lampard 1997; 
Stoker and Jennings 2005, Kuhn 2009 and 2016 for Switzerland). This influence 
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generally ends when a relationship finishes, and people’s party preference may 
consequently change. Relationship dissolution also leads to changes in a person’s social 
network (Wrzus et al. 2013), and the loss of some connections and the addition of new 
ones may also lead to a change in political preferences (Zuckerman 2005). This 
argumentation, however, does not help to explain in which direction a party preference 
will change following separation. 
Second, and most commonly suggested as an explanation for a link between 
separation and left-wing voting, the dissolution of a partnership, be it from marriage or 
unmarried cohabitation, is a life event that often comes with far reaching consequences, 
including negative effects on people’s socio-economic status and financial resources 
(Amato 2010; Avellar and Smock 2005; Vaus et al 2017). As voters’ socio-economic 
status is known to have a major impact on policy attitudes and party preferences (e.g., 
Brooks et al. 2006; Lipset 1981; Evans 2000) and is a driver behind changes in party 
preference (Sanders and Brynin, 1999), such a change in socio-economic status after 
partnership dissolution is anticipated to affect party choice. There is indeed evidence 
that a change in people’s financial situation affects their party preference (Kuhn 2016), 
and there is broad agreement that the economic impact of separation is an important 
pathway contributing to a change in voting behaviour following separation 
(Arunachalam and Watson 2015; Edlund and Pande 2002). Because of the experience of 
a decrease in their socio-economic position, separated individuals may become more 
likely to support policies around social welfare benefits and thus left-wing parties that 
tend to focus on such policies (Gerson 1987; Rehm 2009). Our hypothesis thus reads as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The experience of a separation increases the likelihood of 
supporting economically left-wing parties.  
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However, there are also gender differences in the economic consequences of 
separation, with men generally suffering fewer negative economic consequences 
(Bröckel and Andreß 2015; Leopold 2018; Vaus et al 2017) and women facing more 
often challenges related to raising children as a lone parent (Bernardi & Mortelmans 
2018). This may also explain some of the gender differences in the political alignment 
of voters after separation: as men do better economically following separation, they tend 
to vote more to the right, whereas women – who suffer negative economic 
consequences – tend to vote more to the left. Relying on data from the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), Edlund, Haider and Pande (2005) conclude that 
divorce results in a move towards the left, but only among women. This confirmed an 
earlier American study by Edlund and Pande (2002) which indicated a significant 
gender differential effect of divorce on political preference and that, following divorce, 
women are more likely to support the Democratic Party (see however Finseraas, 
Jakobsson and Kotsadam 2012 who do find that women are more likely to lean towards 
the left but find no evidence that it can be explained by women’s risk of divorce 
measured as relationship quality). Therefore, a further specification of Hypothesis 2 is:  
Hypothesis 2a: Hypothesis 2 is expected to be stronger among women compared 
with men.  
In addition to a change in socio-economic position and a related shift in needs 
and expectations from the government, a person’s changed circumstances following 
separation may also alter family-related and gender role values. Within marriage, 
traditional gender role patterns and conservative family values are still relatively 
common (Baxter et al. 2008; Ryser & Le Goff 2015; Plissner 1983), although 
cohabiting couples tend to have a more egalitarian gender ideology (Davis et al. 2007). 
The event of separation has been related to (changes in) more egalitarian attitudes and 
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less conservative attitudes towards family. For example, Thornton and Freedman (1979) 
concluded that exposure to divorce is related to a shift towards more egalitarian 
attitudes. Thornton (1985) found that people who experienced a divorce subsequently 
held more positive attitudes towards marital dissolution. In sum then, our hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 3: The experience of a separation decreases the likelihood of 
supporting parties with traditional family values.  
Data, measures and method 
Data 
To answer our research question and investigate the link between separation and party 
choice, we analyze data from the SHP. The SHP is an ongoing yearly panel study that 
started in 1999 with 5,074 households (including 7,799 household members) that have 
been randomly selected and followed over time. Refreshment samples were added in 
2004 (2,538 households and 3,645 individuals) and 2013 (3,989 households and 6,090 
individuals). An additional sample for households living in the canton of Vaud was 
added in 2013 (935 households and 1,253 individuals). In 2017 the original sample still 
contained 2,657 households (4,232 individuals), the second sample still included 1,241 
households (1,836 individuals), the third sample comprised 2,178 households (3,411 
individuals). These retention rates are comparable to those obtained in other large-scale 
household panels. As the interviews were conducted by telephone, item nonresponse is 
negligible. For the current study, we use all data from 1999 to 2017 (waves 1 to 19).  
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From the overall sample, we selected couples who have been together at least 
one year and who are Swiss citizens.3 A substantial proportion of these couples 
remained partnered throughout the observation period. These 11,916 continuously 
partnered respondents contributed 76,576 observations.  
There are 1,284 respondents who experienced separation in the panel. This 
group consists of those who were living with a partner at some point in the study, but 
who stopped living together and reported not having a partner for at least one wave, 
yielding 5,485 observations before separation and 5,632 observations after separation. 
Since the data contains gaps in which respondents skipped one or more waves, the 
actual moment of separation may not exactly coincide with the first time we observed a 
separation in the data; it may have taken place earlier. In order to exclude influences of 
a new partner on party preferences, separated individuals were censored from the 
moment they re-partnered.4 The duration of separation ranges between 1 and 17 years 
with an average of 3.6 years. All observations before partnering are dropped from the 
sample. In short, our sample includes partnered individuals and separated individuals 
who do not live with a new partner. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable, party choice, is based on the (open) question asking which 
                                                 
3  We exclude the non-Swiss population since they have no right to vote. The data contain 56 
individuals in same-sex relationships. These are included in the analyses. Excluding them 
gives similar results as those presented below.  
4  Similarly, partnered individuals who transitioned to widowhood or whose partner moved to 
an institution were censored after the event. 
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party respondents would vote for if elections for the National Council were held 
tomorrow. We focus on vote intention for the four largest Swiss political parties, which 
are also the parties forming the consensual Swiss federal government: the Social 
Democratic Party (PSS), the Swiss Christian-Democratic People’s Party (CVP), FDP 
The Liberals (FDP and former liberal party) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). The 
PSS (economic left, liberal family values) acknowledges increased family diversity, 
supports measures to decrease gender inequality, and favours a strong welfare state with 
more financial support for public childcare. In the election for the national council in 
2015, which were the most recent elections organized during the time period 
investigated in the current study, the PSS attained a vote share of 18.9 percent. There 
are two parties on the centre-right: FDP and CVP. The FDP (which attained 16.4 
percent of the vote in 2015) favours limited state intervention and has a liberal view in 
terms of family values (economic right, liberal family values). The CVP (economic 
right, traditional family values) has its roots in Catholicism and holds a traditional 
family view that values the institution of marriage, but it also is in favour of state 
interventions that facilitate paid work for mothers and caring for children for fathers, 
such as public childcare places and flexible workhours. Christianity is invoked as the 
basis for solidarity. It attained 11.6 percent of the vote in 2015. Finally, the SVP 
(economic right, traditional family values) is a populist right-wing party that shares 
CVP’s traditional family values regarding marriage, but, unlike the CVP, also strongly 
promotes a traditional division of labour. It has evolved from a conservative agrarian 
party to a radical right and increasingly authoritarian party (McGann and Kitschelt 
2005). Christianity is pictured by the SVP as the cultural heritage that needs to be 
protected from other influences, notably Islam. The SVP strongly opposes immigration 
and European integration, contrary to the centre-right and left parties. Although the SVP 
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is the largest party (with a vote share of 29.4 percent in 2015) and part of the Swiss 
consensual federal government, it presents itself and is perceived as an opposition party 
rather than as a part of the political establishment. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
parties’ positions on the economic left-right scale and with regard to family values.  
Table 1. Position Swiss parties on the economy and family issues  
 Traditional family 
values 
Liberal family values 
Economic left  PSS 
Economic right CVP/SVP FDP 
 
The voting intention of the respondents included in our analytical sample in 
2015 were comparable to the outcomes of the 2015 national elections for the FDP (16.3 
percent), whereas respondents who support the PSS were overrepresented (26.5 percent) 
and those who support the CVP and the SVP were underrepresented (8.3 percent and 
21.7 percent respectively).  
Of the couples where both partners indicated a vote intention for a specific party 
(19 parties in total), 61 percent named the same party. The likelihood to support the 
same party increases with duration of the relationship, from 47.9 percent in the first year 
to 63.9 percent for those having the same partner over 20 years.  
To measure vote intention, we constructed a dummy variable for each of the 
four parties with 1 referring to intending to vote for that particular party and 0 referring 
to not intending to vote for that particular party. The latter category also includes 
observations where a respondent did not prefer any party (including “don’t know”, 
“would not vote” and “would vote for a candidate, not a party”, “no party”5). While our 
                                                 
5  In the election of the Swiss national council, citizens can vote for as many candidates as 
there are seats available in their canton (between 1 and 36). Candidates of all party lists can 
be combined.  
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focus is on party choice, we also ran our analyses with a dichotomous dependent 
variable, coded 0 when respondents gave any party preference or reported that they 
would vote for a candidate and not a party, and 1 if the response was “don’t know”, 
“would not vote” or “no party.” As such, we assess to what extent separation is linked 
to having a party preference or not.  
Explanatory Variable 
Our central explanatory variable is the experience of separation. This variable is coded 
as a dummy variable, taking the value of 0 in all periods in which respondents are living 
with a partner, and 1 in all periods after separation and in which respondents indicated 
not having a partner. This means that all observations from the continuously partnered 
group are coded 0, and that the group of respondents who experience separation has 0’s 
before the separation and 1’s after the event (until they have a new partner, at which 
point they are dropped from the analysis). This modelling strategy supposes that the 
treatment effect is constant over time.6  
Control Variables 
In our logistic regression analyses explaining party choice (Figure 1, and Table 3), we 
control for some basic socio-demographic characteristics to make the separating group 
comparable with the continuously partnered group. In particular, we control for gender 
(female, male (ref.)), age, education (lower than secondary (ref.), general upper 
secondary, apprenticeship, vocational tertiary, academic tertiary level), own children 
                                                 
6  The number of observations in the separation group was unfortunately too small to have 
enough power for more detailed ways of modelling separation, such as years since 
separation.  
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younger than 18 living in the household (yes, no), employment status (employed, 
inactive/unemployed (ref.)), and duration of the relationship in years (for separated 
individuals, the duration refers to the length of their previous relationship). To account 
for the higher attrition rate of separated individuals we also included the number of 
waves the respondent was interviewed. Finally, we include dummy variables for survey 
years to account for each period. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables 
included in this study. We do not control for variables which we argue may explain why 
those who separate have a different party preference prior to separation such as 
religiosity (de Graaf and Kalmijn 2006; Lehrer 2004) given that they may explain away 
the effect of separation.7   
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
SVP 86,971 0.123 0.329 0 1 
PSS 86,971 0.186 0.389 0 1 
CVP 86,971 0.0810 0.273 0 1 
FDP 86,971 0.118 0.322 0 1 
No party 86,971 0.176 0.380 0 1 
Separated 87,693 1.128 0.490 1 3 
Female 87,693 0.541 0.498 0 1 
Age (cont.) 87,693 51.27 14.18 18 97 
Education: Lower than sec.  87,471 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Education: General upper sec.  87,471 0.0965 0.295 0 1 
Education: Apprenticeship 87,471 0.431 0.495 0 1 
Education: Vocational tertiary 87,471 0.189 0.391 0 1 
Education: Academic tertiary 87,471 0.177 0.382 0 1 
Own children younger than 18 in 
household 87,693 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Employed 87,689 0.711 0.454 0 1 
Duration of partnership (cont.) 85,264 21.90 11.28 0 35 
Note: Cont. indicates that it is a continuous variable.  
 
                                                 
7   When we include religiosity in the analyses explaining selection effects, we find that the 
negative effect of separation on the likelihood to vote CVP becomes weaker. 
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Method 
Our analyses aim to investigate the link between separation and party choice and 
examine to what extent this may be the result of selection or causality. To do so, we 
present three analyses below. In the first analysis, we assess overall differences between 
partnered and separated individuals, by pooling all panel waves and estimating for the 
different dependent variables (party preferences) logistic regression models. We cluster 
standard errors within persons to account for the nested structure of the data 
(observations within individuals). To examine the overall difference between partnered 
and separated individuals, we compare all observations in which respondents reported 
to be partnered with all observations in which individuals are separated. This approach 
gives an overall picture of differences between partnered and separated individuals and 
is similar to the approach commonly used in cross-sectional studies. All control 
variables presented above are included in this analysis. 
In the second analysis, we investigate to what extent any differences in party 
preference between partnered and separated individuals may be due to selection into 
separation. To test whether individuals who separate already have different preferences 
prior to separation compared with continuously partnered individuals (as suggested in 
Hypothesis 1), we again estimate logistic regression models with clustered standard 
errors within persons. This time, we compare observations from respondents who will 
stay with their partner in the SHP with observations from partnered individuals who will 
separate at a later wave in the panel (but we only include the observations from when 
they are partnered and thus exclude observations after their separation). With this 
design, any differences in party preferences between the groups indicate a selection 
effect: individuals who separate hold different party preferences already prior to 
separation. All control variables presented above are included in the models. 
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The third and final analysis focuses on the causal effect of separation on vote 
intention (as suggested in Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3) by looking at changes in 
party preference over time. To do this, we apply a fixed effects approach, which 
compares the difference in vote intentions before and after separation within individuals 
(among those who separate). The continuously partnered group are included in the 
analysis to separate the effect of aging from the effect of separation. We only include 
age as a control variable in this analysis, as there is little variation over time in the other 
control variables.8 In contrast to cross-sectional regression, selection into separation 
will not bias coefficients in fixed effects regression models as long as the selection is 
due to time-invariant effects or observed effects.9  
For the analyses examining selection and causal effects of separation, we also 
estimate a model that includes an interaction between gender and separation allowing us 
to test Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a. 
                                                 
8   We did run analyses including the control variables presented above. The results of these 
analyses were the same as the results for the analyses presented below (Table 4).  
9  Although conditional logistic models would also be suitable because they fit the binary 
dependent variable, their drawback is that they only include persons who show variation on 
the dependent variable, thus those whose party preference changes between waves. This 
would imply a drastic reduction of the sample size. Another difficulty of the conditional 
logistic models is that the size of the regression coefficients cannot be interpreted and it is 
not possible to compute predicted probabilities. As a sensitivity check, we estimated all 
models both with logistic and linear regression to ensure that the linearity assumption does 
not influence conclusions. The main results were similar in both models.  
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Results 
Cross Sectional Analysis: Comparison between Partnered and Separated 
Individuals 
In a first analysis, we estimate logistic regressions including all control variables 
presented above and comparing the overall difference in party preferences between 
partnered and separated individuals (tables not shown). Figure 1 presents the predicted 
probabilities for separated and partnered individuals based on these models as average 
marginal effects.  
 
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities Comparing Partnered and Separated Individuals  
 
Figure 1 reveals that separated individuals are slightly more likely to prefer the 
PSS (probability of 21 percent) compared with partnered individuals (probability of 18 
percent, p=.04). This finding is in line with findings from existing studies showing that 
divorce is related to left-wing preferences (Chapman, 1985; Kingston & Finkel, 1987; 
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Edlund et al., 2005; Edlund & Pande, 2002). We also find that separated individuals are 
somewhat less likely to prefer the Christian-Democratic CVP; a party with traditional 
family values (probability of 6 percent) compared with partnered individuals 
(probability of 8 percent, p=.003). Yet, partnered and separated individuals do not have 
significantly different preferences for the SVP; a party which also focuses on traditional 
family values. There is no difference between partnered and separated individuals for 
the FDP either. Finally, separated individuals are more likely to report no political 
preference (for a party or a candidate) compared with partnered individuals (probability 
of 20 percent among partnered individuals and probability of 17 percent among 
separated individuals, p=.01).  
Logistic Regression Models Examining Selection 
In the second part of our analysis, we assess to what extent the differences in party 
preference between continuously partnered and formerly partnered individuals results 
from selection. In other words, we examine whether the group who eventually separated 
already had different party preferences, compared with the continuously partnered 
group, before experiencing separation in logistic regression models. We include the 
same control variables as in the previous models. To take into account the likelihood of 
an anticipation effect of separation, we omitted the observation from the wave prior to 
separation in these models.10 The results are presented in predicted probabilities (Table 
3 and Figure 2) and show for each party the likelihood of preferring that particular party 
for the separation group (before separation) and the continuously partnered group. 
                                                 
10  This observation was not included since the effects of separation may already start to show 
in anticipation of the event of separation when the individual is still partnered.  
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Table 3. Logistic regression analyses explaining party preferences comparing partnered individuals who will eventually separate prior to their 
separation and continuously partnered individuals 
 SVP SVP PSS PSS CVP  CVP  FDP FDP 
No 
preference 
No 
preference 
 b (tstat) b (tstat) b (se) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) 
Pre-separation  
(ref. remaining partnered) -0.198 -0.228 0.099 0.046 -0.420** -0.273 0.021 0.093 0.131 0.218 
 (-1.64) (-1.31) (1.08) (0.32) (-3.12) (-1.32) (0.18) (0.52) (1.69) (1.73) 
Female -0.553** -0.555** 0.051 0.046 -0.096 -0.086 -0.283** -0.276** 0.559** 0.567** 
 (-9.17) (-8.97) (0.89) (0.77) (-1.29) (-1.13) (-4.86) (-4.61) (12.06) (11.81) 
Pre-separation* female  0.059  0.085  -0.258  -0.136  -0.125 
  (0.25)  (0.47)  (-0.98)  (-0.59)  (-0.80) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.011** 0.011** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.77) (0.77) (-0.09) (-0.08) (3.48) (3.49) (-7.68) (-7.67) 
Education (ref. lower than 
sec.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   General upper secondary -1.083** -1.083** 0.971** 0.971** -0.151 -0.151 0.564** 0.564** -1.125** -1.125** 
 (-7.68) (-7.69) (8.32) (8.31) (-0.96) (-0.96) (4.26) (4.26) (-12.21) (-12.21) 
   Apprenticeship -0.256** -0.256** 0.290** 0.290** 0.051 0.052 0.483** 0.484** -0.378** -0.378** 
 (-3.05) (-3.06) (2.87) (2.87) (0.41) (0.42) (4.72) (4.73) (-5.95) (-5.94) 
   Vocational tertiary -0.567** -0.567** 0.471** 0.470** 0.093 0.095 0.876** 0.877** -0.987** -0.986** 
 (-5.55) (-5.56) (4.12) (4.11) (0.67) (0.68) (7.81) (7.82) (-12.46) (-12.45) 
   Academic tertiary -1.995** -1.995** 1.006** 1.005** 0.003 0.005 0.937** 0.938** -1.456** -1.455** 
 (-15.85) (-15.85) (9.20) (9.19) (0.02) (0.03) (8.29) (8.29) (-17.61) (-17.60) 
Own children younger than 18 
in household -0.164** -0.164** -0.081 -0.081 0.391** 0.391** -0.062 -0.062 0.011 0.011 
 (-2.97) (-2.97) (-1.76) (-1.76) (6.31) (6.32) (-1.13) (-1.13) (0.27) (0.28) 
Employed 0.103 0.103 -0.005 -0.004 -0.054 -0.054 0.008 0.008 -0.180** -0.180** 
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 (1.73) (1.73) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.82) (-0.82) (0.15) (0.14) (-4.35) (-4.35) 
Duration of relationship -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.015** 0.015** 0.006 0.006 -0.014** -0.014** 
 (-1.47) (-1.48) (-0.68) (-0.69) (3.20) (3.20) (1.65) (1.65) (-5.07) (-5.06) 
Number of observations -0.021** -0.021** 0.025** 0.025** 0.009 0.009 -0.013** -0.013** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (-4.16) (-4.16) (5.77) (5.77) (1.53) (1.53) (-2.92) (-2.92) (-8.63) (-8.63) 
Constant -0.890** -0.889** 
-
2.131** 
-
2.127** -2.960** 
-
2.968** -2.933** -2.937** 0.397** 0.390** 
 (-5.18) (-5.16) (-12.81) (-12.74) (-12.76) (-12.77) (-15.85) (-15.83) (3.00) (2.95) 
Observations 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 79,563 
Pseudo R squared 0.053 0.053 0.024 0.024 0.010 0.010 0.024 0.024 0.071 0.071 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Note: Predicted Probabilities are based on the analyses presented in Table 3. 
Figure 2.  Predicted probabilities Comparing Continuously Partnered Individuals 
(“partnered”) and Individuals Who Will Experience Separation Prior to Their 
Separation (“pre-separation”)  
 
Table 3 indicates that individuals who will eventually separate are significantly 
less likely to vote CVP before they separated (probability of 6 percent) compared with 
the continuously partnered group (probability of 8 percent, p=0.002). This confirms 
Hypothesis 1 which expected separated individuals to have less support for parties with 
traditional family values already prior to their separation. The likelihood of supporting 
PSS, SVP or FDP is similar between both groups. Additionally, there is no selection 
effect for having a party preference (compared with having no party preference). We 
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find no support for Hypothesis 1a which stated that selection effects may differ for men 
and women as none of the interactions with gender are significant (see Table 3).11  
Fixed Effects Models Examining the Causal Effect of Separation 
In the third part of our analysis, we look at the causal effect of experiencing separation 
and investigate to what extent changes in political party preference occur following the 
event of separation on the individual level. In order words, we examine to what extent 
there is a causal effect of separation on party choice. To do so, we estimate individual 
fixed effects models controlling for age and period effects to take changes in 
preferences over time and as people age into account, irrespective of life cycle events. 
The results are presented in Table 4.  
                                                 
11  We also empirically explored interactions between separation and marital status 
(cohabitation or marriage), religious participation, income, relationship duration, education 
and parenthood (own children younger than 18 living in the household). These analyses 
showed significant interactions only for the CVP; parents, married individuals and those 
with apprenticeship or academic tertiary level education who separate are significantly less 
likely to support the CVP prior to separation compared with those who remain partnered.  
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Table 4. Fixed effects models of political party preference, estimating within-person change in the separation group and controlling for changes 
in preferences in the continuously partnered control group  
 SVP SVP PSS PSS FDP FDP CVP CVP No 
preference 
No 
preference 
 b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) b (tstat) 
Separated 0.011* -0.000 -0.008 -0.002* -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.013 0.013* 0.014 
 (2.21) (-0.05) (-1.40) (-0.21) (1.37) (-0.64) (-1.20) (-1.88) (2.01) (1.36) 
Separated*female  0.017  -0.009  -0.003  0.012  -0.002 
  (1.80)  (-0.84)  (-0.26)  (1.45)  (0.15) 
Age .002*** .002*** -.003*** -.003*** .001*** .001*** .001*** .001*** -.001*** -.001*** 
 (10.26) (10.23) (-16.22) (-16.20) (6.92) (6.92) (5.44) (5.42) (-3.72) (3.72) 
Constant 0.030 0.030 0.353 0.352*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 
 (3.32) (3.34) (34.60) (34.58) (5.54) (5.53) (4.93) (4.95) (18.16) (18.16) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 n= 86,971 from 13,159 individuals 
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While we expected to find a positive causal effect of separation on the likelihood 
of supporting a left-wing party and a negative causal effect for parties with traditional 
family values (Hypotheses 2 and 3), Table 4 indicates that separation only affects a 
preference for SVP. In contrast to our hypotheses, however, following separation, the 
likelihood of preferring the SVP increases by 1 percentage point (or an odds ratio of 
1.29 in the conditional logit model). Separation also increases the likelihood of not 
stating any party preference by 1.3 percentage points, suggesting that the experience of 
separation has a modest demobilizing effect. 
When testing whether the hypothesized increased support for left-wing parties is 
found especially among women (Hypothesis 2a) we find no significant interaction effect 
with gender for any of the parties, nor for having no party preference.12  
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                 
12  We also empirically explored interactions between separation and marital status 
(cohabitation or marriage), religious participation, income, relationship duration, education 
and parenthood (own children younger than 18 living in the household). These analyses 
revealed that some of the effects of separation are conditional upon these sociodemographic 
characteristics of individuals. Parents who separate are more likely to support the SVP and 
less likely to support the CVP following separation compared with individuals without 
children under 18 in the household. Married individuals who separate increase support for 
the SVP and decrease support for the FDP more strongly compared with cohabitors who 
separate. Separation increases support for the SVP only among the lower educated and lower 
income groups. Support for the CVP and FDP increases more strongly following separation 
for individuals with tertiary education (for the FDP also for general upper secondary 
education) compared with lower than secondary educated individuals. Separation has a 
stronger negative effect on the likelihood of supporting PSS among individuals who attend 
religious services compared with those who do not. The likelihood to not express a party 
preference increases especially following separation from marriage and from longer lasting 
relationships.  
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Separation is known to have a major impact on people’s lives (e.g. Voorpostel & Coffé 
2012; Kalmijn and Broese van Groenou 2005; Stoker and Jennings 1995; Duncan and 
Hoffman 1985). Little is known, however, about the effect of separation on party 
choice. Yet, given the increasing levels of separation, it is crucial to understand the 
impact of separation on people’s party preference. Better understanding the ways in 
which life events, such as separation, affect political party preferences will also advance 
our insight into the increasing volatility in voting behaviour. Most of the limited 
available research indicates a “marriage gap” in voting, with married people being more 
conservative and right-wing compared with divorced or unmarried individuals (e.g. 
Plutzer and McBurnett 1991; Plissner 1983; Weisberg 1987). This scholarship has 
typically treated marital status as a static individual characteristic and looked at two-
party systems (see however Kern 2010). By contrast, and relying on longitudinal 
household panel data, we looked at partnership status in a dynamic way. Such a 
dynamic approach allowed us to disentangle selection into separation from the causal 
effect of separation on a change in party preference. 
Our analyses, using data from the SHP (1996-2017), found that separated 
individuals were overall somewhat more likely to support the left-wing PSS and less 
likely to support the Christian CVP, which is in line with previous findings based on 
cross-sectional models. These differences in party preference, however, partly pre-date 
the event of separation: individuals who will separate at a later point in time are less 
likely to prefer a political party with traditional family, the Christian CVP, compared 
with continuously partnered individuals. This supports the idea that part of the 
differences in party preferences between partnered and separated individuals stems from 
different party preferences prior to the event of separation, rather than being an effect of 
separation itself. The fact that characteristics known to be related to party choice, such 
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as religiosity and traditional family values (Inglehart and Norris 2003), are also known 
to affect the likelihood of experiencing a divorce (Cooke 2006; De Graaf and Kalmijn 
2006; Haller and Hoellinger 1994; Kalmijn and Poortman 2006) may explain this.  
Our study does, however, also find a modest causal effect of separation on 
people’s preference for the populist right-wing SVP increasing following separation. 
This causal effect of separation holds particularly among women. This finding goes 
against our expectations of a decreased likelihood of supporting a party with traditional 
family values and right-wing parties following separation. One possible explanation is 
that SVP-voters may be offset by the traditional views on family before separation but 
may be attracted by their populist character after separation. In particular, the SVP’s 
protectionist discourse of independence from the European Union and limiting 
immigration may be attractive to those who have seen their financial situation worsen, 
as often is the case following partnership dissolution. This discourse tends to take the 
foreground and outshines the stance of the SVP on family values in the public debate. 
Future research could usefully explore possible explanations for this finding in greater 
detail.  
Although not the main focus of our study, our analyses also suggest a 
demobilising effect of separation. This lower likelihood of having any political party 
preference among separated individuals is due to a causal effect of separation. 
Individuals who separate are less likely to have a clear party preference after separation 
than when they lived with their partner. We also find that disengagement is somewhat 
more pronounced among women compared with men. This is in line with prior studies 
demonstrating a relationship between divorce and disengagement from politics (Coffé 
and Bolzendahl 2010; Voorpostel and Coffé 2012).  
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The cross-sectional analyses revealed a positive effect of separation on 
supporting the PSS. The small size of the effect and the limited number of individuals in 
the SHP who experienced separation, prevented us, however, from assessing whether 
the cross-sectional differences between partnered and separated individuals in their 
preference for this party was due to selection or whether there was a causal effect of 
separation. The low number of separations also prevented us from investigating whether 
and how the effect of separation changes over time since we had to assume that the 
effect of separation was stable over time. As is found for other outcomes, such as life 
satisfaction and health (Anusic et al. 2014), it is, however, likely that the effect of 
separation is temporary. This is a promising avenue for future research on the link 
between separation and party preference.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, distinguishing selection from causality is the 
best way to assess the impact of life events such as separation, and adds to our 
understanding of the implications of an experience like separation on individuals’ 
political preferences. While our analyses showed that the impact of separation is 
relatively modest in the Swiss context, it is nonetheless important. As only one of the 
many factors shaping political party preference, we argue that even a small effect 
translates into a substantial number of voters in Switzerland who change their party 
preference based on the occurrence of a “private” event in the life course. Changes in 
family composition and marital and cohabitating relationship status, including 
increasing levels of separation, are apparent in Switzerland and most other post-
industrialized societies. Taking the effect of separation into account improves our 
understanding of (changes in) electoral behaviour and outcomes. Investigating this 
event, as well as other life course events such as the transition to parenthood or home 
ownership, may improve our understanding of volatility in party preferences.     
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